Backup Verification Log
Illustrative rows for a fictional logistics platform, Halstow, with 41 services. Keyed on restores attempted, not on backup jobs. Never attempted is a state, not a blank cell.
| Date | System | Elapsed | Outcome | What failed | Where the failure lived |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-02-11 | Orders database | 185 min | pass with findings | 82% of the elapsed time sat outside the restore step | process |
| 2026-02-04 | Billing ledger | aborted at 51 min | fail | Snapshot encrypted with a key held in the account being recovered from | key custody |
| 2026-01-28 | Rating engine DB | 74 min | fail | Restored onto the default parameter group; refused every application connection | configuration |
| 2026-01-21 | Partner API DB | 63 min | fail | Restored into the default security group; nothing could route to it | network |
| 2025-11-06 | Orders search index | 140 min | fail | Backed up from a replica whose replication had broken 6 weeks earlier | backup source |
| 2025-09-17 | Customer document store | aborted at 12 h | fail | Objects had aged into a tier with a 12-hour retrieval | storage tier |
| 2025-06-12 | Analytics warehouse | 206 min | pass | none | n/a |
| never attempted | 23 further services | n/a | untested | Nothing has ever been tried | unknown |
Thirty-four green jobs, eleven systems ever restored, five failures. And not one of the five was a bad backup. Every failure is in the machinery around the data: what the backup read from, where the key lives, what tier the objects aged into, what configuration a restored instance inherits.
Two of them are documented behaviour. A restored database instance takes the default parameter group and the default network permissions unless the restore call names others. Both restores succeeded. Neither system could be used.
The bottom row is the real finding. Twenty-three systems have a backup, a green dashboard, a recovery objective in a plan, and no evidence of any kind that they can come back.